Abstract. Let P(x) --0 (rood N) be a modular multivariate polynomial equation, in m variables, and total degree k with a small root x0. We show that there is an algorithm which determines c(~ 1) integer polynomial equations (in m variables) of total degree polynomial in cmklog N, in time polynomial in craklog N, such that each of the equations has xo as a root. This algorithm is an extension of Coppersmith's algorithm [2] , which guarantees only one polynomial equation. It remains an open problem to determine xo from these linearly independent equations (which may not be algebraically independent) in polynomial time. The algorithm can be used to attack an RSA scheme with small exponent in which a message is padded with random bits in multiple locations. Given two encryptions of the same underlying message with multiple random paddings of total size about 1/9 of the length N (for exponent 3 RSA), the algorithm can be used to obtain the message.
Introduction
Let P(x) be a degree k polynomial in x over the integers. It is well known that for the modular equation P(z) --0(rnod p), where p is a prime, all integer roots (rnog p) can be determined in polynomial time (Berlekamp's algorithm). All integer roots for the integer equation P(x) = 0 can also be determined in polynomial time ( [11] ). However, the modular equation modulo a large composite N is not known to be solvable in polynomial time (unless the factorization of N is known). This is the basis of various public-key cryptographic schemes, the most well known of which is RSA [12] .
Coppersmith [2] recently showed that if the modular equation P(x) --0 (rnod N), has a small root So < N 1/~, then this root can be determined in time polynomial in klog N. He showed that using the lattice basis reduction algorithm ( [11] ), one obtains another polynomial Q (x) over the integers, of degree polynomial in klogN (and in polynomial running time), such that Q(z0) --0. Then Q(0~) can be solved for x0 using previously known algorithms.
Coppersmith [2] also showed that his technique can be applied to multivariate polynomials (in variables x). However, only one integer multivariate polynomial equation was obtained, which is insufficient to determine the small root Xo. He mentioned solving for xo as an open problem. The problem is further complicated by the fact that even if one obtains several integer multivariate polynomial equation, they may not be sufficiently independent to eliminate variables so as to obtain a univariate polynomial equation.
We make progress in solving this open problem by showing that one indeed gets severM (linearly independent) integer multivariate polynomial equations satisfied by the small root x0. Let P(x) be an integer polynomial of total degree k, in m variables. Then, if P(xo) = 0(rood N), we obtain ck multivariate integer polynomial equations each satisfied by the same root x0. The total degree of each of these polynomials is polynomial in cmklog N. The running time of the algorithm is also polynomial in cmklog N. However, it remains an open problem whether these linearly independent equations can actually be solved for xo in polynomial time, by e.g. eliminating variables (using resultants -cf. [8] ).
For example, one may have obtained two equations (x 2 4-1)f(~, y) = 0, and (y24-1)f(~, y) --0. They are definitely linearly independent, but the only integer solutions are the ones which satisfy f(~, y) = 0.
For simplicity, we do the analysis for the univariate case, as the multivariate case is a simple generalization (see [2] ). We show that for the univariate degree k polynomial equation P(x) = 0 (mad N), if there is a small integer root I;~ol < N 1/~, then one obtains ck linearly independent polynomial equations each satisfied by z0 (ck > 1).
The algorithm in [2] was obtained by doing lattice basis reduction ( [11] ) of the dual lattice formed from the coefficients of P(x) and its powers. The analysis of the dual lattice (instead of the primal) makes it even more difficult to prove (or disprove) that the equations obtained are algebraically independent. In section 4 we give an algorithm which works by doing lattice basis reduction of the primal lattice. It is a form of generalized Diophantine approximation ( [11] ). The fact that Coppersmith's result [2] can be obtained alternatively by working in the primal lattice was observed independently by Howgrave-Graham [5] . Infact, he goes on to prove that the two alternate approaches are equivalent.
Finally, we mention that finding small roots of modular polynomial equations has great practical significance. Consider the public key encryption scheme RSA [12] . The public key in this scheme is a large composite number N, a product of two secret primes. Also part of the public key is a number called the exponent e. A plaintext 9 has the following encryption c
Suppose the plaintext 9 is actually obtained from a message by padding it with some random bits. For example, in 1024 bit RSA (i.e. N is 1024 bits long), suppose the message m is only 1000 bits. Then the plaintext x could have been set to m appended by r, where r is a 24 bit random number (padding).
As an application of the univariate case, Coppersmith [2] showed that for RSA with small exponent (say 3), two encryptions of the same message with random paddings reveals the message, as long as the padding is less than 1/9 of the length of N.
He also showed, how multiple paddings are also prone to similar attacks, if one can solve the multivariate modular polynomial equations for small roots. In the previous example, a plaintext x with double padding could have been obtained from m by both prefixing and suffixing it with random paddings of 12 bits each. In section 6 we give details of how such an attack is actually launched.
Recently, Bleichenbacher [1] has shown that the KMOV public key cryptosystem (based on elliptic curves modulo large composites) can be attacked using the multivariate algorithm. Essentially, given the ciphertext, and 2/3 of the plaintext, the other 1/3 of the plaintext can be obtained. In section 7 we summarize both the KMOV scheme, and the attack on the KMOV scheme.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces lattices and the LLL lattice basis reduction algorithm. Section 3 gives the details of the algorithm and the analysis for the univariate case, using the dual lattice. Section 4 introduces the Diophantine Approximation variant, which is based on the primal lattice. Section 5 states the multivariate case. In section 6 and 7 we give applications of the multivariate case to RSA and KMOV. In Section 8, we give empirical evidence as to how the equations obtained are very independent, and rather random in nature. 
In this situation we say that bl, b2, ...b,, form a basis for L, or that they span L. We recall the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization process. The vectors b~ (1 < i < n) and the real numbers #ij (1 < j < i < n) are inductively defined by 
.P,~, q for which
Ip~ -qa~ l <_ e for 1 < i < n,
Lemma 3 follows from Lemma 2.
Obtaining more than one polynomial equations
We show that for a polynomial equation of degree k(mod N) in one variable ~, if there is a small root (smaller than N1/k), then the same solution satisfies two (in-fact more than two) polynomial equations over integers of degree polynomial in k. Moreover, these polynomial equations can be obtained in time polynomial in klog N.
The following is essentially an improved analysis of the technique outlined in [2] , along with three new observations which we point out towards the end of this section.
Let s0 be the small unknown solution of P(z) = 0 (mod N). W.l.o.g assume that P(x) is monic. Let e : r/logN, where r > 1. Let c > 1/k be a constant. The intention is to obtain ck different polynomial equations. Let h be an integer such that hk > max(7, (4clogN)/(r -1)). Let n = hk. For each pair of integers i,j satisfying 0 < i < k, 1 <_ j < h, set Q~, (x) = x'P(x) j Thus, Qij (zo) = ~NJ,
where
The upper right block B, of size (hk) x (hk-k), has rows indexed by the integer g with 0 < g < hk, and columns indexed by 7(i, J) = i + (j -1)k, with 0 < i < k and 1 < j < h, so that 0 < 7(i,j) < hk-k.
The entry B [g,7(i,j) ] is the coefficient of ~z in the polynomial Qij (x).
The lower right block C is a (hk -k) • (hk -k) diagonal matrix, with the value gJ in each column 7(i, j). The upper left block A is a (hk) x (hk) diagonal matrix. A [g, g] has the rational approximation to 6 9 X g, where
and --1/v hk)
We restrict our attention to [z0] < X ....
(2) Let row vector r be such that its left-hand entries are rg --z0 g, and whose righthand entries are rT(,j ) -0~0. Let s : rM. From (1) and (2), it follows that the Euclidean norm of s is strictly less than 1. (see [2] ).
The matrix M can also be written as where I is an identity matrix ((hk -k) x (hk -k)). Note that (A1 'T A2'T) T is still upper triangular. It also follows that (A1 ~T A3'T) T is upper triangular. In fact, we will soon calculate the diagonal entries of (A1 ~T A3'T) T.
Obtain M from M' using row exchanges. 
det(i.t) = dec(m)
Now we restrict our attention to M. By construction of M, and the row operations performed, ~/is still an upper triangular matrix. The lower diagonal elements of jlT/, for k < 7(i,J) + k < hk, are given by ~r.r(i,j)+k-~(ij)+~ = _NJ6X-(~(iJ)+k).
The next step in [2] is to do the LLL basis reduction of the lattice generated by rows of M (see Lemma 2) . The LLL algorithm goes through a series of steps involving elementary operations on the rows of the matrix representing the lattice. Let, bi, and b~ denote the intermediate basis vectors and the corresponding Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization vectors respectively. It is a property of the LLL algorithm that max {Ib;I 2 9 x < i < ,~} is non-increasing.
Since M is an upper triangular matrix, if we start the LLL algorithm on /Q, with the order of the rows reversed, the Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization of this initial matrix will yield a diagonal matrix, with the diagonal entries remaining the same. The maximum of the absolute value of these diagonal entries is Nh-16X-(~+(h-2)k). Denote this quantity by bmaz. Continuing this argument, we have that any such lattice element must have ci = 0, for n -ck < i < n. In particular s is such an element.
Let s = rM = rI'Alr = rI"~r, where M is the matrix obtained by performing the LLL algorithm above. Now, rI" has the property that the entries with index i, n -ck < i < n, are zero. Thus, the same holds for s~r -1. Since, s has only powers of z as variables, this yields ck equations in z, ..z '~-x. These equations are linearly independent as M is non-singular.
These polynomial equations over integers can be solved to obtain z0.
Summarizing, the improved analysis was based on the following observations: 
Diophantine Approximation Alternative
The analysis in the previous section (as in [2] ) was done with the dual lattice formed from the equations Qij(z), i.e. the lattice was reduced with respect to the rows instead of the columns. Further, at the end we had to invert the matrix ~r to obtain the polynomial equations over the integers. Thus, it is difficult to get an insight into how the integer equations were obtained from the original polynomials Qij (z). Without such an insight it would be even more difficult to prove if the equations obtained are algebraically independent.
In this section, we do a similar analysis but with the primal lattice, and show that the integer polynomial equations are obtained by a weighted (and generalized) Diophantine approximation (see Lemma 3). an integer it will have to be zero. We would have an integer polynomial equation as long as one of the coefficients is non-zero. Since a~: = 1 (P is monic), the latter condition is guaranteed by requiring 0 < [q[ < N The former condition can be fulfilled by doing a simultaneous Diophantine approximation of ai/N (weighted by X i) -see section 2. However, the requirement [q[ < N does not allow for a good enough approximation, and hence requires X to be rather small (X < Nt/k2).
We now employ the trick used in [2] ; we use all of the polynomials Qij (as defined in Section 3). Let h be an integer to be determined. Let 7(i, J) be as defined in the previous section. Consider the following equation which holds for
zo, Yo = P(zo)/N, all integers pg and qT(iJ):
hk-1 /z-lh-1
Here, ag,~(ij) is the coefficient of z~ in the polynomial Qij(z).
If we can upper bound each of the outer summands on the LHS (in absolute value) by 1/hk, then since the right hand side is an integer, it must be zero. This would yield an integer polynomial equation. It would be non-trivial if each [q'y(id)l < NJ, and some Iq~(/j)[ > 0.
To this end, we set up a matrix M as in the previous section, again intending to do a (generalized) weighted Diophantine approximation. Let X (to be determined) be an upper bound on z0.
The upper right block B, of size (hk) x (hk -k), has entry B[g,7(i,j)] = (a,,~{~,j)/NJ)Xg.
The lower right block C is a (hk -k) x (hk -k) diagonal matrix, with the value #j (to be determined) in each column 7(i, J) 9 The upper left block A is a (hk) x (hk) diagonal matrix with A[g, g] = Xg.
We perform lattice basis reduction on the lattice generated by the columns of M. Let bl be the first vector in the reduced basis, which is a linear combination of the columns of M, given by integers P9 and q'KiJ)" Thus, each of the outer summands on the LHS of equation (3) is less than Ibi]. 
It is a property of the reduced basis that tbil < 2("-i)14(det(M))Z/'~,

Also, note that det(M)
yhk(h~-l)/2, k ,
The inequalities (4) and (5) impose opposing conditions on #j. A simple calculation shows that both (4) and (5) can be satisfied if X < N z/t-~, where 9 > 1/log N. This requires h to be O(log N) as well.
To obtain more than one equation, we bound other small vectors b2, b3 etc. of the reduced basis. Thus, if Ibtl < 1/hk, bt would yield another set of integers p#, and q~(ij), and hence another polynomial equation, by (3).
First note that, since M is an upper-triangular matrix, and bt is an integer linear-combination of the columns of M, therefore ]bt[ > min(lMii]), 0 < i < n. Call this quantity Mmi~. Another property of the reduced basis is that Ib:] < 2(i-1)/21b'1, for 1 < j < i < n. It follows that, The minimum diagonal entry of this matrix is #h-t Nh-1. The determinant of .~f is same as that of M, and the previous analysis holds. This allows us to obtain bounds for X and the corresponding h (for a given c) similar to those in Section 3.
Ib#l _< 2~("-~)/(~(~-(#-l)))(det M)~/(~-(#-~))M,~ -I)/(~-(#-I)) , fo~
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Multivariate polynomials
Let P(x) ~ 0 (rood N) be a modular multivariate polynomial equation, in m variables, and total degree k with a root Xo. Moreover, let the root be small, i.e. Jz0~J < N ~', for i < i < m, and ~ai < (I/k). There is an algorithm which determines ck(ck ~ I) linearly independent integer polynomial equations (in m variables) of total degree polynomial in cmklog N, in time polynomial in cmklog N, such that each of the equations has xo as a root.
The proof of this statement is exactly the same as that of the univariate case (Section 3 or 4), except that the polynomials qij and the matrix M are built in a more generalized fashion (see [2] ). For completeness, we reproduce from [2] . We build the matrix M analogous to that of section 3. The vector r contains all monomials of total degree at most T, so the sum of the total degrees of these monomials is (see e.g. [7] )
(r+m 
.
4=1
For example, for m = 2, the powers of N add upto k2(h -1)h(2h -1)/12.
With the requirement XJa~ < (l/k) -e for appropriate e we will have Ib~l > 1, for n -ck < i < n, where n is the dimension of the matrix .~/. Note that the dimension of the matrix ~/is the total number of monomials which is (T +rnrn). Here N is a large composite, which is part of the public key.
If a message m is not of full length (for example, if m is less than 1024 bits, when N is 1024 bit long), one could pad m with a random number t to obtain a number x of full size. Thus, if m was only 1000 bits long, a 24 bit random string could be appended to m to obtain x, in which case x = 224. rn-4-t Alternatively, more than one random number could have been used to fill different contiguous locations of ~. For example, the top 12 bit positions, and the least significant 12 bits could be used for padding with tl and t2 respectively, whereas m could be placed in the middle, in which case a~ ----21012-tl -4-212 9 rrt -4-t2
If a message is encrypted twice using these schemes, then the results of the previous sections can be used (heuristically) to obtain the message as follows.
As an example, we will consider the case of double padding mentioned above.
Note that, is we have two encryptions of m, i.e. of plaintexts z and z', both of which were obtained from m by double random paddings then
(tl' -tl) + (t2' --t2)
Let t : 21~ (tl' -tl) + (t2' -t2). Then c = z 3 (mad N)
Using a result of Franklin and Reiter [4] (also see [3] ) it follows that t(c' + 2c-t 3) t(3~3 + 3z~t + 3=t~) (mod N)
Hence, we can recover z if we know c, c', N, and t.
Ift is not known, but the random paddings were small, i.e., each of (tl'-tl), and (t2' -t2) were small (say, less than N1/lS), then we could do the following. First, we eliminate z, by taking the resultant ([8]) of the above two equations with respect to z. Thus,
Resultant= (x a -c, (z + t) 3 -c') =, t 9 + (3c -3c')t 6 + (3c ~-+ 21c~' + 3(c')~)t~ + (c -c')~ = 0 (rood IV) This is a multivariate polynomial in (tl' -tl), (t2' -t2), with small roots. Thus, we can apply the algorithm of section 5, and there is a possibility that it may yield (tl' -tl), and (t2' -t2), and hence t.
In section 8 we show some empirical results, and mention the practicality of this attack.
Application to Attacks on KMOV
Let N be a large composite integer, product of two secret prime numbers p and q. The public key of the KMOV [6] public-key scheme is N and an integer e relatively prime to (p+ 1)(q % 1). A message is a pair (m~, rn~) where m=, rny E S/(N ). It is encrypted by computing (c=, %) = e. (m~, m~) (mad N), over an 2 3 (rood N). The scalar multiplication elliptic curve parameterized by b = my -m x by e refers to adding (m=, m~) to itself e times in the group of the elliptic curve (see [9] , [6] or [l] for definition of an elliptic curve). We will not go into the details of this group, but it suffices to note that a point (zl, yl) is on the elliptic curve parameterized by b if yl 2 : Xl 3 + b (rnod N).
Since, both the plaintext (m=, r%) , and the ciphertext (c=, %) are on this elliptic curve, it follows that 
Empirical results
We implemented the algorithm for the univariate case using the package LiDIA [10] . Surprisingly, not only did we we obtain a large number of equations, but the GCD of the polynomials turned out to be a polynomial of a very small degree. For example, the following polynomial P(z), has root z0 = 1 (modulo g = 84).
The algorithm of Section 3, yielded the following polynomials (for h = 3), each of which evaluated to zero at z0 = 1 -1 +z -z 2 +2z 3 -2z 4 +2z 5 -z 6 +z 7 -z s -I +2z z -z 6 -1 -3z -x 2 +2z 3 +6z 4 +2z 5 -z 6 -3z 7 -z s -37 +32x z +5z 6 37z -32x 4 -5z 7 -1 +~ +73~2 +2z3 _2z4 _62z5 _z6 +z~ _llzS 1607 -1607z +146z 3 -146x 4 +llz 6 -1157 1610 +x -1608~ ~ +140x 3-2z 4 -144z s +14z 6 +~ -12z s
The GCD of these polynomials is (z -1).
When dealing with multivariate polynomials, the dimension of the matrix involved in the basis reduction starts becoming rather large. As mentioned at the end of section 5 the size of such a matrix for bivariate polynomials (i.e ra -2) is square that of T = hk. If we want to detect upto 1/k of the missing bits, then the running time of the algorithm is proportional to 2 l~ since = r/log N (see the beginning of section 3). Since, the LLL algorithm itself has time complexity O(n61og 3 Nh), where n = (hk) 2 is the dimension of the basis, the total time complexity is O(21~ s N). For 1024 bit RSA, k = 3, h has to be rather large, which makes the algorithm rather impractical for current computers. If we are only interested in detecting much fewer missing bits, then the size of the matrix and hence the running time may be more amenable, and actually feasible.
Conclusion
We make progress in solving modular multivariate polynomial equations with small roots. Our algorithm obtains several integer polynomial equations in the multiple variables. However, the problem of showing that these equations can actually be used to determine the roots is still open. The problem lies in the fact that even though the equations may be linearly independent, one may not be able to eliminate variables by taking resultants.
However, empirical results show that the different equations obtained are rather random in nature, and hence their resultant may be able to eliminate all but one variable. On the other hand, even though the algorithm is polynomial in k, and log N, the exponents are rather large for the multivariate case. Thus, the algorithm is not practical (for current computers) if the size of the root is as large as N 1/~. Thus for instance, for 1024 bit RSA with exponent 3, it may not be practical to launch an attack to detect 340 missing bits in the plaintext (spread over two contiguous regions). However, if much lesser number of bits are missing, the algorithm can be used effectively to detect those bits.
